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STEPHEN ZAMORA*

Sir Joseph Gold
and the Development of
International Monetary Law
Since the International Monetary Fund was first established in 1945,' financial
institutions and monetary agencies-those organizations, public and private, that
determine the availability of money and credit in an economy-have taken on
increasingly dominant roles in every nation of the world. Coupled with this
dominance is a constantly increasing level of complexity. Making full use of
advances in computers and telecommunications, financial institutions each year
add newly modelled "financial products" to the already complex network of
international financial transactions. The new products, as well as new methods of
selling and trading them, eventually require new regulatory structures to keep the
financial industry under some semblance of governmental oversight and control.
The result is an international financial system characterized by legal regimes of
spiralling complexity.
The complexity of international financial law 2 challenges the powers of
comprehension of even the hardest-working student of money and banking. It is
difficult enough to understand a single set of transactions; to understand the
workings of an entire area of international financial law requires many years of
study.That is why subjects such as international monetary law, the subject of this
article, have been best understood and explained by those who measure their
involvement in decades rather than in years.
*Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund were adopted at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, U.S.A., on July 22, 1944. The IMF Articles entered into force December
27, 1945. The original Articles can be found in 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 60 Stat. 1401. The current version
of the Articles, as amended by the Second Amendment on April 30, 1976 (effective April 1, 1978),
are to be found in 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
2. As used here, the term "international financial law" is a broad term encompassing both
private and public international law. It includes the private law of international banking relationships,
national regulation of financial transactions, and the public international law of money, including the
rules of the IMF. See INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW (R. Rendell 2d ed. 1983).
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Sir Joseph Gold, to whom these articles are dedicated, not only measures his
study of international monetary law in decades (more than four, to be exact), he
has also been in a unique position to understand international monetary law and
to contribute to the development of it. As a member of the Legal Department of
the International Monetary Fund from 1946 to 1960, as General Counsel and
Director of the Legal Department from 1960 to 1979, and as Senior Consultant
to the Fund thereafter, he has studied and written about international monetary
law from the vantage point of an active participant who has had access to
information that is not readily available to scholars outside the Fund. Furthermore, his career in the Legal Department of the Fund coincided with the creation
of international monetary law as a recognized specialty of public international
law.
This article will focus very generally on the development of international
monetary law, 3 and on the role of Sir Joseph Gold in shaping that development.
The article concludes with several conjectures on the future development of
international monetary law.
I. The Development of International Monetary Law as a
Recognized Branch of Public International Law
In 1946, when Sir Joseph Gold first joined the Legal Department of the
International Monetary Fund, he and his fellow lawyers faced a virtual tabula rasa
in regard to rules governing international monetary relations. Before that time,
international monetary law was scarcely a subject of legal inquiry. Treatises on
the law of money were confined largely to discussions of comparative law and
conflicts of law, focusing on domestic legal principles that recurred in different
states. 4 This dearth of scholarship is understandable: until the postwar period,

3. As used in this article, "international monetary law" refers to those rules of public
international law, conventional or customary, that govern or influence monetary relations between
States, as well as relations between States and international organizations, such as the IMF or the
European Monetary System.
4. The classic English-language treatises of Professors Mann and Nussbaum, both of which first
appeared in the late 1930s, concentrated on domestic and comparative law and on conflicts of law
(private international law). After the Second World War and the creation of the IMF, both authors
added sections dealing with the public international law of money, although the books remain heavily
weighted towards the comparative law approach. Compare A. NussBAUM, MoNEY IN THE LAw (I st ed.
1939), with the revised edition, A. NUSSBAUM, MoNEY INTHE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
(1950).
Compare also F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL AsPECr OF MoNEY (1st ed. 1938), with the later editions of
1953, 1971, and 1982. The lack of emphasis on international monetary law continues in the fourth
edition (1982) of Professor Mann's work. In referring to international monetary law, including the
law of the IMF, he states:
These are certainly important rules which international law has grafted upon the
municipal law of money. Yet their scope is relatively limited and modest ....
The
reason for the absence of a comprehensive international law of money lies not only in
the grave practical difficulties which stem from political and economic causes as well
VOL. 23, NO. 4
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States rarely consulted with each other, and practically never cooperated, on
matters having to do with exchange rates or other monetary relations. The terms
"international monetary relations" and "international monetary law" were essentially unknown: monetary affairs were matters of domestic, not international
concern. As Sir Joseph Gold has written, "[i]n the past, states exercised an almost
unrestrained freedom to deal with their balances of payments, even though the
policies of one state had an impact on the balances of payments of others." 5 As
a consequence," [b]efore the Articles of Agreement of the Fund came into existence,6
international monetary law, whether customary or conventional, was negligible."
This is not to say that monetary relations were never dealt with by international
agreement before Bretton Woods. 7 Commentators have noted that, as far back as
the Middle Ages, rulers occasionally concluded bilateral agreements (known as
standardizing agreements) fixing the ratio between gold and silver and the
metallic contents of coins, in an attempt to influence exchange rates for their
respective currencies. 8 Such agreements were not common, however; more often
international cooperation was minimal. Even when gold and silver coins were
traded at a ratio fixed by law, the opportunity for profitable operations by
arbitrageurs tended to defeat the legal requirement. 9
The closest thing to a rule of international monetary law may well have been
the Catholic Church's rules against usury. The secular power of the Church
throughout Europe made the Canon Law prohibition of charging interest on the
as from the fact that in many respects a common standard is lacking, but is also to be
found in the widespread impression that the existing body of international law has
failed to develop any rules of conduct in monetary affairs.
F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 463 (4th ed. 1982)
5. Gold, Law and Change in InternationalMonetary Relations, 31 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 223
(1976).
6. J. GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW INTHE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 2 (IMF Pamphlet Series No.
32, 1980).
According to Professor Nussbaum, as early as the seventeenth century, Spanish and German
theorists connected monetary law with the "law of nations," in the sense of legal concepts universally
accepted, but Professor Nussbaum recognized that these notions did not amount to international law
as we understand it, viz., rules governing the relations between nations. A. NUSSBAUM (1950 ed.),
supra note 4, at 314.
7. Not everyone agrees with Sir Joseph's characterization of the pre-IMF state of international
monetary law. Professor Mann has taken exception to the statement quoted supra in the text at note
6. According to Professor Mann, "[t]he whole of Part IV of the present work [i.e., Professor Mann's
treatise] proves the contrary." F.A. MANN (1982 ed.), supra note 4, at 506 n.86. Professor Mann's
book does not disprove the negligible existence of international monetary law, however, but rather
demonstrates just the opposite; the book discusses very few examples of international monetary law,
either treaty or customary law, prior to 1944.
8. P. EnzIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 109-10 (2d ed. 1970); M. R. SHUSTER, THE
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MONEY 11- 14 (1973); Schwarzenberger, The Principlesand Standards
of InternationalEconomic Law, [1966] 1 RECEUIL DESCOURS 1, 63.

Professor Nussbaum dates the first international monetary agreements from the standardizing
agreements concluded during the fifteenth century between England and the Low Countries. A.
NUSSBAUM (1950 ed.), supra note 4, at 504.
9. P. EINZIG, supra note 8, at 80.
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use of money a rule of "international monetary law" that affected the development
of foreign exchange practices. '0 Even the Canon Law rule was often observed in
the breach, and dealers in bills of exchange exercised their ingenuity to find ways
around the rules, just as their modern counterparts do today."
During the mid-nineteenth century several attempts at multilateral monetary
cooperation were made, most notably the creation of the Latin Monetary Union
in 1865, a multilateral standardizing agreement involving France, Italy, Belgium,
Switzerland, and Greece. The treaty establishing the union created standards for
the issuance of gold and silver coins by the member governments, each of which
undertook to receive the coins of other members in payment of debts. The scope
of the "union" (a grander name than the arrangement deserved)
was limited, and
2
the obligations that were imposed were not well observed. '
Somewhat more ambitious than standardizing agreements were the stabilization agreements, of a bilateral and multilateral nature, that appeared in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The earliest forms of these agreements
involved reciprocal credit arrangements between central banks to support
intervention against currencies in foreign exchange markets; the central banks
that entered into them were not governmental institutions. It was not until the
1930s that government-to-government stabilization agreements were first concluded, providing a useful precedent for the balance of payments financing that
would become one of the principal functions of the International Monetary
Fund. t 3 The 1930s also saw the introduction of domestic exchange controls in
many countries, which gave rise to bilateral clearing agreements between
governments as a way of rationing foreign exchange. ' 4 The appearance of such
clearing agreements, which were discriminatory and disruptive of trade patterns,
caused the architects of the IMF Agreement to react by including in the
Agreement a liberal code of international payments.
In short, the IMF Agreement was preceded by a haphazard pattern of
international (mostly bilateral) agreements adopted by political rulers, usually for
the purpose of stabilizing foreign exchange markets. While international monetary law was not exactly nonexistent, it was, as Sir Joseph has pointed out,
"negligible." The international agreements that were adopted were usually
short-lived. They did not provide for mechanisms of international enforcement.

10. Id. at 69, 79, 89-90.
11. Id. at 69, 93.
12. A. NUSSBAUM (1950 ed.), supra note 4, at 506-08; see also F.A. MANN (1982 ed.), supra note
4, at 492.

13. On stabilization agreements, see A. NUSSBAUM (1950 ed.), supra note 4, at 508-12. The
United States concluded various such agreements, under specific authorizations of Congress, during
the 1930s. Gold, Public InternationalLaw in the InternationalMonetary System, 38 SW. L.J. 799,
805 (1984).
14. P. EIzIG, supra note 8, at 292; A. NUSSBAUM (1950 ed.), supra note 4, at 517-23.
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Most important, the international agreements concluded prior to Bretton
Woods did not challenge the general tenet that monetary policies and exchange
rates were matters of purely domestic control, with no responsibility to the
international community. Until Bretton Woods, the regulation of money was
deemed to be a "privilege of national sovereignty"1 5 rather than a subject of
international concern and negotiation. This belief was so strong that it came to
be recognized as a principle of customary international law.' 6 The state of
customary international law is well summarized by Professor Mann:
[S]ubject to such exceptions as customary international law or treaties have grafted
upon the rule, the municipal legislator is free to define the currency of his country, to
decide whether or no [sic] it should be based on gold, to depreciate or appreciate its
value, to permit or abolish gold clauses, to impose exchange control or to take other
measures affecting monetary relations. Customary international law does not normally
fetter the municipal legislator's discretion in these matters or characterize his measures
as an international wrong for which he could be held responsible. . . And where
international relations arise, customary international law allows each State to devise its
own system of private international law and thus to determine the extent to which the
monetary laws of foreign States are applicable within its boundaries. 17

Some experts have argued that customary international law does impose certain
affirmative rules on States-for instance, an obligation to consult and collaborate
in international monetary matters,' 8 or an obligation not to restrict payments for
current international transactions. 19 Nevertheless, the arguments in favor of such
affirmative obligations are not supported by convincing evidence of State practice,
judicial opinion, or scholarly writing. The weight of authority seems to support
the general rule that States are not hindered in the freedom with which
they conduct
20
their monetary affairs by rules of customary international law.
To summarize, the origins of international monetary law should effectively be
dated from Bretton Woods, and not before. Scattered treaty obligations and a few
rules of customary international law are not sufficient to make up a discrete
category of public international law. The creation of the IMF was significant not
just because, as a multilateral agreement, it incorporated many member
countries; it was also important because of the comprehensiveness of the scheme
and the limits that it placed on national sovereignty. The negotiators of the IMF

15. J. GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 3 (1988).
16. Serbian and Brazilian Loan Case, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 20/21, at 44; see also F.A.
MANN (1982 ed.), supra note 4, at 465-66; M.R. SHUSTER, supra note 8, at 47-54, 73.
17. F.A. MANN (1982 ed.), supra note 4, at 465-66.
18. R. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 650-55 (1985).
19. F.A. MANN (1982 ed.), supra note 4, at 472.
20. See the discussion in M.R. SHUSTER, supra note 8, at 55-72, 76-91. Professor Shuster does
identify a rule of customary international law that exchange controls introduced as instruments of
international economic warfare will be considered as violating customary international law. Id. at 91.
See also Zamora, Is There Customary InternationalEconomic Law?, 32 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. (1989)
(forthcoming).
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Agreement wished to establish, for the first time on a broadly international scale,
a coherent paradigm of rules governing virtually all aspects of international
monetary relations. For the first time, too, governments agreed to create an
intergovernmental organization, complete with a professional staff of civil
servants, to oversee this regime.
II. The Development of International
Monetary Law after Bretton Woods
The legal regime that has developed around the IMF occupies a central
position in international monetary law. Other legal regimes have been created
since Bretton Woods, most notably that of the European Monetary System.
Nevertheless, the IMF retains its central position by virtue of its global
membership, which means that other organizations must fit into the IMF network
and conform in some way to its regime.
The following paragraphs are not intended as a comprehensive commentary on
the legal regime of the IMF, but rather as a general characterization of that regime. 2'
A.

CHARACTERIZING THE FUND'S LEGAL REGIME

In an age in which the term "interdependence" has become a clichd, it is easy
to forget that the obligations first written into the IMF Agreement were
revolutionary in 1944, even if they were not necessarily recognized as such at the
time. 22 "The [IMF] Articles reflected the radical idea that because exchange
rates were matters of international interest, they should be subject to international
scrutiny and normally to international agreement. ' 23 The Fund took seriously
this obligation of scrutiny: during the period of fixed exchange rates, from 1945
to 1971, "the Articles were applied with the conviction that no matters involving
exchange rates were outside the competence of the Fund ..
24
At the outset, the Fund's jurisdiction over exchange rate policies was the
central element of a legal regime that included a code of conduct for international
payments, credit facilities for balance of payments assistance, and mechanisms
21. It is beyond the purpose of this article to summarize the current IMF legal regime, which
other authors have done in outstanding fashion. See, e.g., R. EDWARDS, supra note 18; A. LOWENFELD,
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (2d ed. 1984); B. "lbw, THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM

1945-1988 (4th ed. 1988).

22. John Maynard Keynes, an astute observer of human behavior, was aware that the significance
of the World Bank and IMF Agreements would not be apparent to most people at the outset. In a
statement prepared for the BBC evening news on the final day of the Bretton Woods Conference,
Keynes stated: "We have been working quietly away in the cool woods and mountains of New
Hampshire and I doubt if the world yet understands how big a thing we are bringing to birth." J.M.
KEYNES, Activities 1941-1946: Shaping the Post-War World; Bretton Woods and Reparations, in 26
COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 105 (D. Moggridge ed. 1980).
23. J. GOLD, Continuity and Change in the International Monetary Fund, in 2 LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 381, 408 (1984).

24. Id. at 449.
VOL. 23, NO. 4
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for consultation. Since the effective date of the Second Amendment of the Fund
Agreement in 1978, which recognized the legitimacy of floating exchange rates,
IMF rules and practices have become "softer" and more complex. 25 Indeed,
opinions now differ as to whether the IMF administers a legal regime, or merely
serves as a forum for consultation. There is little question, however, that the IMF
continues to play a central role in the international monetary system.26
Sir Joseph Gold-the most prolific commentator on the IMF regime-has
always been clear in expressing his understanding that the IMF administers a
legal regime, 27even if the protagonists in the Fund do not recognize it. 28 He
recognizes, however, that the legal regime of the IMF bears little resemblance to
the traditional, positivist notion of a legal regime as a set of precise rules,
vigorously enforced by a central authority that levies sanctions appropriate to any
violations. Rather, in Sir Joseph's view, the IMF's legal regime is a part (albeit
an important part) of a broad set of norms that are applied with increasing
flexibility by the Fund, as demanded by the exigencies of modem-day monetary
politics. In his 1982 Hague lectures, Sir Joseph noted:
[I]f the international monetary system is thought to consist of the agreements prevailing
at any time among or between governments, realism requires that both "agreements"
and "governments" should be given an extensive meaning. The agreements should not
be limited to treaties or the international agreements that are given other names but are
classified with treaties. The international monetary system, according to this approach,
can be taken to be the international monetary relations that are regulated by the body
of rules and practices that monetary authorities, whether political or non-political,

consider themselves legally or morally bound to observe or engage in. On this view the
international monetary
system would be broader than the area covered by international
29
monetary law.

25. On the amendment and operation of the exchange rate regime, see K.

DAM, THE RULES OF THE

(1982); Edwards, The
Currency Exchange Rate Provisions of the Proposed Amended Articles of Agreement of the
GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYsTEm

International Monetary Fund, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 722 (1976); Gold, Strengthening the Soft
InternationalLaw of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983).
26. Accord R. EDWARDS, supra note 18, at 655.
27. In addition to his many writings on specific issues of monetary law, Sir Joseph addressed the
subject of the international monetary law character of the IMF. See, e.g., J. GOLD, supra note 6;
J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; AN INTRODUcTION (IMF
Pamphlet Series No. 4, 1965); J. GOLD, supra note 13; Gold, InternationalLaw and the IMF, 14 FIN.
DEV. 35 (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter Gold, InternationalLaw and the IMF].
28. The organs that take the decisions of the Fund are composed mainly of economists and
bankers. They do not regard themselves as charged with the task of creating, adapting,
or even applying international law, except perhaps on the rare occasions when they are
called on to draft an amendment of the Articles or on the more frequent occasions when
they interpret the Articles. A distinguished American painter, the late Barnett Newman,
once said that aesthetics for the artist is like ornithology for the birds. The remark can
be applied to the law of the Fund. The persons who compose the organs of the Fund
are Newman's artists, the lawyers on the staff of the Fund are the aestheticians.
Gold, InternationalLaw and the IMF, supra note 27, at 37.
29. Gold, Developments in the International Monetary System, The International Monetary
Fund, and InternationalMonetary Law Since 1971, [1982] 1 RECEUIL DESCOURS 107, 156.

WINTER 1989

1016

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

In short, if one focuses narrowly on legal prescriptions, one would lose the
significance of much of what the Fund accomplishes as a regulator of international monetary relations. The IMF's regime includes the rules "that monetary
authorities are legally bound, or consider themselves morally bound, to observe. . . . [T]he international monetary system consists of a complex of
relationships among countries on matters ...that are governed by rules and
understandings that are more extensive
than international monetary law as a
30
branch of public international law."
International monetary law may constitute only part of the system administered by the IMF, but it is an important part. The rules articulated in the IMF
Agreement and in decisions of the Executive Board generally provide a barrier
to exaggerated actions that might be undertaken either by the organization of the
Fund or by one its members.Yet the legal barrier is not a rigid one, which causes
some commentators to question whether a real barrier exists. The legal rules of
3
the IMF are often written in board language that permits latitude of application; '
where the rules are more definite, they often incorporate provisions for IMF
approval of deviations from the stated norm.3 2 Furthermore, as is discussed
below, 33 the secrecy with which much of the Fund's practice is shrouded
prevents the accumulation of identifiable "common law" principles.
In short, the Fund's legal regime should not be seen as a set of everyday
prescriptions, like traffic laws. Rather, the Fund's corpus juris should be viewed
as a constitution, setting the overall course of action and leaving operational
applications to the staff and Executive Board, which respond to the direction of
member governments. 34 The lack of precise application of specific rules has
allowed the Fund to exercise considerable flexibility, while remaining on a
general course in the direction of exchange rate stability and relative freedom of
international payments. Of course, those who are disappointed with the Fund's
achievements would substitute the term "lack of discipline" for the term
"flexibility."
The need for a proper balance between the discipline imposed by a set of
precise legal rules and the discretion needed for political acceptability of
decisions was identified as early as 1942 by John Maynard Keynes, in his
proposal for an International Currency Union. 35 Keynes himself wished the Fund
to conform to a regime of technical rules that would require relatively few

30. Gold, supra note 13, at 801 (emphasis added).
31. The best example of this statement is art. IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement. See also art.
V, sec. 3.
32. See, e.g., IMF Articles of Agreement, art. VIII, sec. 2(a); art. VIII, sec. 3.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
34. Sir Joseph's views regarding the IMF Articles as a constitution can be found in J.GOLO,
supra note 6, at 16-17.
35. For a discussion of the "contest between rule and discretion" see J. GOLo, Keynes on Legal
Problemsof InternationalOrganization,supra note 23, at 841, 848-49.
VOL. 23, NO. 4
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decisions of fundamental importance by the organs of the Fund. By the time of
the Second Amendment to the Articles, the balance had shifted to discretion over
discipline. 36 Nevertheless, legal rules continue to play a role in the Fund. In
addition to providing the constitutional underpinnings of the Fund, legal rules
establish procedures for channelling the demands of members, including demands
for balance of payments assistance; 37 they also place limits on the intrusiveness
of IMF surveillance of members' economies.38
B.

THE FUND'S RETICENCE TO IMPOSE REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS

While the Fund and its members generally operate in conformity with written
rules, the Fund has always displayed an extreme reticence to the application of
legal sanctions when the rules are not observed. The Fund's Articles themselves,
from the original version through the Second Amendment, have been reluctant to
attach a label of illegality to the conduct of members. 39 Furthermore, "the Fund
has followed an unformulated policy of the sparing use of remedies both for
breaches of obligation and for conduct not treated as a breach although it can be
subjected to remedies." 4° Thus, for example, in 1971, when the United States
refused to maintain fixed exchange rates in transactions involving the dollar
(after abandoning official convertibility of the dollar into gold), the Fund did not
attempt to apply any remedies or levy any sanctions under article IV, section 6
of the original articles. 4 1 Finally, in those cases where Fund approval is needed
for certain exchange practices, outright disapproval is rare; 42 instead, the
"requirement" of approval is used as leverage by the Fund staff in behind-thescenes lobbying for changes in members' policies.
In the financial assistance that the Fund provides, there has traditionally been
a studied attempt to avoid the stockpiling of legal obligations. The clearest

36. Id. at 849-50.
37. See generally, 13

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTs 25-154 (Apr. 30, 1987) (Executive Board Decisions

covering use of Fund resources).
38. Id. at 8-23.
39. J. GOLD, supra note 6, at 30. For example, art. IV, sec. 4(b) of the original IMF Articles
stated the central obligation of the fixed exchange rate regime as follows: "Each member undertakes
...to permit within its territories exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies of
other members only within the limits prescribed under Section 3 of this Article." If the
"undertaking" was not met, the member would not be in violation of the Agreement, but could be
held ineligible to use the resources of the Fund under sec. 6 of the same article. As Sir Joseph points
out, this language deliberately avoided the stigma of violation or breach in recognition of a State's
sovereignty over exchange rates. J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 45-47.
40. J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 45-47; see also R. EDwARDs, supra note 18, at 39-42; Gold, The
"Sanctions" of the InternationalMonetary Fund, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 737 (1972).
41. Gold, supra note 13, at 817. On the legality of the United States' abrogation of official
convertibility of the dollar for gold, see id; see also K. DAM, supra note 25, at 187-89.
42. Zamora, Exchange Control in Mexico: A Case Study in the Application of IMF Rules, 7
Hous. J. INT'L L. 103, 120 (1984).
WINTER 1989
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example of this is in the creation of a unique form of quasi-legal arrangement, the
stand-by arrangement, as the preferred operational form. Described by Sir
Joseph Gold as a "consensual but legally non-contractual instrument," 4 3 the
stand-by arrangement is an example of a conscious decision by the Fund to make
its resources available without requiring the conclusion of a legally enforceable
agreement. There are political and economic reasons for this; 44 in essence, when
the Fund is forced to intrude into sensitive areas of national economic policy (as
it must when stand-by arrangements are concluded), it does so as diplomatically
as possible, without visiting undue embarrassment on a member by forcing the
signature of a legal agreement. The promise of future drawings from the Fund's
resources, and the threat of withholding such drawings, are seen as sufficient
mechanisms for enforcement.
C.

GAPS IN THE

IMF LEGAL

REGIME

The architects of the IMF Agreement conceived of the IMF as an organization
that would concern itself with three principal areas of international monetary
relations: exchange rate policy, balance of payments adjustment, and a liberal
mechanism of international payments. In the area of international payments, a
compromise was reached at Bretton Woods that resulted in the establishment of
a regime to reduce, and hopefully to eliminate, governmental restrictions on
payments for current international transactions (exports, imports, tourism,
invisibles, etc.), 45 while allowing governments the freedom to restrict transfers
of capital, both short-term and long-term. 46 Because of this, from its inception,
the Fund has not concerned itself with issues surrounding capital movements.
"Because of the low priority given to freedom of capital movements by the
drafters of the IMF's Articles, international efforts to develop rules to liberalize
capital movements shifted to other forums,' 47 such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development or the European Economic Community. Of course, when capital movements give rise to balance of payments
problems, the Fund's interest is necessarily engaged. Thus, the Fund was
eventually forced to confront the Third World debt crisis that resulted from
governments' overdependence on foreign loans and the failure to stem capital
flight. While the Fund may be called in to treat the harmful effects of capital
movements, however, it has limited jurisdiction to exercise preventive medicine
in this area.

43. Gold, InternationalLaw and the IMF, supra note 27, at 36.
44.

J. GOLD, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE FUND'S STAND-By ARRANGEMENTS AND WHY IT MATTERS

5-11 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 35, 1980).
45. IMF Articles of Agreement art. VIII, sec. 2(a).
46. IMF Articles of Agreement art. VI, sec. 3; see J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPrrAL MOVEMENTS
UNDER
THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 21, 1977).
47. R. EDWARDS, supra note 18, at 459.
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As financial markets become increasingly global in their operations, capital
movements-and the policies that affect them-have acquired an overwhelming
importance in the international monetary system. The lack of rules, or even of
defined policies, dealing directly with capital movements would appear to be a
serious gap in the IMF legal regime. For something that is so important to
international monetary policy, it is odd for the IMF to stand on the sidelines
without taking positions either for or against the freedom of capital movements.
Those who welcome the appearance of a global financial market would favor more
explicit rules to limit government restrictions of capital transfers. On the other
side, proponents of government control would favor more definite rules for
international cooperation in the enforcement of exchange controls that limit capital
flight. As global capital markets develop, it is conceivable that the IMF will be
forced to evolve as well, and to adopt a regime to cover capital movements.
III. Sir Joseph Gold and the Promotion of
International Monetary Law
The task of the lawyers in the Fund has been to find within the law solutions for the
many problems that arise, but at the same time to develop the law into what can fairly
be regarded as an
48 international monetary law and as a discrete branch of public
international law.
As mentioned earlier, when Sir Joseph Gold joined the Legal Department of
the Fund, in October 1946, he and his colleagues had little direct legal precedent
to draw from in developing and applying rules of international monetary law.
During the four-plus decades since that time, Sir Joseph has had the opportunity
to exercise an important influence on this field of law. His activities have influenced the development of international monetary law in three different ways. First,
as General Counsel of the Fund, Sir Joseph has been responsible for the development of specific rules and legal doctrines that comprise the IMF regime.
Second, in an extracurricular role, he has contributed important scholarly publications that have advanced the state of the law. Third, he has been an important
promoter of the notion that international monetary relations are governed by law.
I shall examine each of these in turn.
A.

SIR JOSEPH GOLD AS "PRACTITIONER"

Sir Joseph's direct influence on the development of the Fund's legal
doctrine has been pervasive. As General Counsel from 1960 to 1979, he
served as principal draftsman of both the First and Second Amendments to the
Fund Agreement. He has also acted as the principal guardian of the Fund's
corpus juris. In addition to advising the Fund on the legal effects of its
operations, he has scrutinized texts-from Executive Board decisions to
48. J. GOLD, supra note 6, at 1.
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official communications-to ensure technical consistency with the Fund Agreement. In this regard, Sir Joseph, as well as other members of the Legal
Department, have done more then merely draft conclusions already reached by
the economists and bankers who dominate the Fund. As Sir Joseph has pointed
out, the Fund's lawyers "participate from the outset in the formation of
recommendations and in the negotiation of decisions." 49 Sir Joseph has advised
the Fund on all aspects of its legal relations with other institutions, and on its
relations with member countries. In all of these functions, he has set a high
standard for members of the Fund's Legal Department, which during his tenure
has achieved a reputation for excellence.
Among the most outstanding characteristics of Sir Joseph Gold's lawyering
has been his attention to precise language and exact formulations of texts. His
attention to the accuracy of world usage, grammatical correctness, and logical
consistency is unusual even for a profession that is known for its attention to
language. This characteristic carries over heavily into his academic writings,
which are discussed below. Professor Andreas Lowenfeld has described Sir
Joseph's writing as "combining English attention to style with American
concern for precision."50
This focus on the exactness of language may seem strange when viewed
against the background of IMF practice. To draw a useful comparison, in a
municipal legal setting, legislators and executive branch officials may toil for
weeks over the nuances of language in the draft of a new statute, with the
knowledge that differences in the text will lead to different applications in
practice by courts and administrative agencies. In the case of the Fund, however,
the general practice has often been to avoid precise application of rules, in favor
of maintaining a certain pragmatic flexibility. Why, then, should the General
Counsel of the Fund be so adamant about the precision with which the Fund's
legal and quasi-legal texts are written?
I would offer the following explanation for Sir Joseph's attention to precise
language, despite the Fund's reluctance to adhere to a precise set of rules. The
answer lies in the fact that the Fund is an institution dominated by economists,
the largest class of professionals employed by the Fund. Professor John Jackson
has aptly described how the roles of lawyers and economists, though complementary, necessarily differ:
[T]he lawyer is often more concerned with precision, with individual problems, and
with the practical limitations on realizing objectives, than his counterparts from other
disciplines. The economist skillfully analyzes the overall or macro effects of various
policies, and sees them in statistical terms ....
The lawyer is frequently forced to
resolve individual problems, either those of particular citizens or those of a particular
circumstance, often involving competing policy goals-both (or all of them) valid, but
49. Gold, InternationalLaw and the IMF, supra note 27, at 37.
50. Lowenfeld, Book Review, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 225, 226 (1975) (reviewing J.
MEMBERSHIP AND NONMEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1974)).
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necessitating compromise. Likewise the lawyer is often a person who is asked to
implement a policy and faces practical obstacles to such implementation. Could one say
that the economist tells us what should be done, and then the lawyer worries how to do
it? In some cases, however, the lawyer is forced to (uncomfortably) play the role of the
guardian of long run goals (preserving a constitution, for example) against those who
strive for short term expediency. 51
Professor Jackson's general observation is valid in the context of the IMF. Sir
Joseph Gold has understood that technical consistency and attention to language
is a way of building recognition that the Fund is constrained by written rules.
Contrary behavior-casual attention to the precise language of the Fund's corpus
juris-would weaken the notion that international monetary relations are subject
to rules of law. A lawyer in the International Monetary Fund generally lacks a
base of economic power and political support for promoting the rule of law. The
only tools available to him or her are language and rhetoric. By focusing
attention in the Fund on the constraints of language and the necessity of
following written procedures, Sir Joseph has contributed significantly to the
strengthening of international monetary law.
B.

SIR JOSEPH GOLD AS COMMENTATOR

Sir Joseph Gold's contributions as a scholarly commentator on international
monetary law may be even more important to the development of international
law than his official activities as a "practitioner" of IMF law. While he has
addressed many subjects of international monetary law in his published writings,
he has concentrated on the law and practice of the IMF. His commentaries on the
Fund's legal regime would be important even if the Fund were a transparent
organization. In fact, the Fund-a form of international central bank-is as
opaque as most central banks. In Secrets of the Temple, William Greider
discusses the official secrecy of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, which adds to
the almost religious mystique surrounding the organization. 52 A similar sense of
discretion and even secrecy surrounds the Fund. Executive Board meetings are
not open to the public, and the decisions made in these meetings are often
expressed in general terms that make outside analysis difficult. Even the
language of the Fund is often oblique, resembling the canons of a religion that
can only be fully understood by the inner priesthood.
The Fund often makes a conscious effort to prevent detailed analysis of its
most sensitive actions, in accordance with the desires of its members. 53 Various

51.

J. JACKSON &

W.

DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

xx-xxi (2d

ed. 1986).

52. W. GREIDER, SECRETSOF THE TEMPLE 54 (1987).
53. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND
EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 1988, at 3: "[Tlhe description in the Report of a restrictive practice by a
member does not mean that it is or is not being maintained consistently with the Fund's Articles, or
that, if subject to Article VIII, it has or has not been approved by the Fund."
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commentators have pointed out that the Fund's official secrecy prevents the
accumulation of a body of "common law principles," and thus prevents the
build-up of legal or even quasi-legal precedents. 54
This lack of transparency has long presented an obstacle to those who have
studied the Fund. During the first twenty years of the Fund's existence, there was
relatively little scholarly writing by international lawyers concerning the IMF. In
1964, J.E.S. Fawcett noted that only "fragmentary" commentaries had appeared
to that date. 55 Sir Joseph Gold has commented that the relative dearth of
scholarship may be due to "the difficulty of gaining access to information about
56
the practice of international organizations that have monetary functions."
Despite this difficulty, the monetary disruptions of the 1970s and 1980s have
prompted commentators outside the IMF to focus
more attention on international
57
monetary law and to elucidate IMF practice.
The importance of Sir Joseph Gold's scholarship must be measured against
this background of mystery surrounding the IMF. Nothing in the job description
of the General Counsel of the Fund says that its occupant must continuously
publish books and articles in order to try to elucidate the Fund's rules and its
practices. That Sir Joseph has chosen to do so is due not just to a scholarly bent,
but more importantly to a sincere desire to explain IMF operations and legal
doctrine. In addition, as is discussed below, there is a promotional purpose
behind the legal publications, which lend support to the existence of international
monetary law as a constraint on States.
In his scholarly writings, just as in his lawyering, Sir Joseph has paid close
attention to precise language, for the same reasons that motivate him in his law
practice: imprecise language and textual inconsistencies may weaken the force of
international monetary law, which is not strong to begin with. His scholarship is
characterized by very close textual analysis, which he may often supplement
with explanations of the economic effects of certain actions. His close attention
to the language of the IMF's corpusjuris makes him averse to any form of verbal
58
shortcuts, even if they are made in an attempt at simplification or clarification.

54. K. DAM, supra note 25, at 133, 260; Lowenfeld, Is There Law After Bretton Woods? (Book
Review), 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 380, 396 (1983); Zamora, supra note 42, at 119. See Sir Joseph's
response to some of these criticisms in J. GOLD, Problems of Information on Exchange Controls, in
3 THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 633-60 (1986).
55. Fawcett, The International Monetary Fund and International Law, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 32,
32 (1964): -[T]he Fund has emerged in the last decade as an effective and influential international
institution; yet it has not had the full attention from publicists in international law which that would
call for, and discussion has been rather fragmentary."
56. J. GOLD, supra note 23, at 8.
57. See, e.g., studies cited supra notes 21, 25.
58. Sir Joseph's general disdain of paraphrasing rules can be seen in a recent article criticizing
secs. 821 and 822 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1988), which restate certain obligations of international monetary law that originate in the IMF
Agreement. After a close textual comparison, Sir Joseph wrote:
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Finally, while Sir Joseph Gold's scholarship sheds light on the Fund's legal
regime, it does not do so in a way that is openly critical of the Fund's practice
or of the practice of its member States, since his position in the Fund has not
allowed him that freedom. Yet his scholarship has always been intellectually
honest, and he sets a high standard for other commentators on international
monetary law by the detail with which he examines legal issues. Furthermore,
his writings afford information that allows others to criticize and evaluate the
outsider an
Fund. In the words of Kenneth Dam, "his writings provide for the
59
indispensable substitute for access to internal Fund documents."
C.

SIR JOSEPH GOLD AS PROMOTER OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW

As both practitioner and commentator, Sir Joseph Gold has contributed indirectly to the recognition of international monetary law as a viable branch of public
international law. He has done so by virtue of the quality of his legal analysis and
by his insistence that other legal analysts-whether they be judges, lawyers, or
professors-must base their conclusions on correct and consistent assumptions of
law. In addition, he has actively promoted the idea that international monetary law
does exist, at times publishing articles with this direct purpose in mind. 60 He has
been able to show how the IMF's legal regime creates obligations that might
otherwise be ignored. For example, in an early publication, Sir Joseph argued that
while traditional international law holds that a State cannot incur obligations or
enjoy rights under a treaty to which it is not a party, the IMF nevertheless does
affect the conduct of nonmembers through its legal effects on members. 6 1
His efforts to promote the recognition of international monetary law have been
severely tested since 1971, when the discipline of the fixed exchange rate system
gave way to the permissiveness of floating exchange rates. Even during the
period of "lawlessness" that reigned from 1971 to 1978, however, before the
Second Amendment took effect, Sir Joseph could find recognition of the
existence of a commitment by most governments to the necessity of returning to
a "lawful" state as soon as possible. 62 His faith in the need for international
monetary law was undeterred.
There is a story that Mozart, after playing a new composition, was asked what he
meant by it, whereupon he sat down and played it again. Enough has been said to
show the dangers of paraphrasing the text of treaty provisions and presenting the
redraft as if it had some authenticity. Would it not be more helpful to those who use
the Restatement if the authentic text were reproduced and paraphrase included in the
Reporters' Notes?
Gold, The Restatement of the ForeignRelations Law of the United States (Revised) and International
Monetary Law, 22 lr'L LAW. 3, 15 (1988).
59. K. DAM, supra note 25, xvi-xvii.

60. See supra note 31.
61. J. GOLD, THE FUND ANDNON-MEMBER STATES: SOME LEGAL EFFEcrs (IMF Pamphlet Series No.
7, 1966).
62. See Gold, InternationalLaw and the IMF, supra note 27, at 36:
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Some commentators have criticized Sir Joseph Gold for his willingness to
"expect too much of the law where economic forces are more effective." 63 He
has also been accused of overemphasizing the importance of the rules and
practice of the IMF. 64 These criticisms might be seen as positive qualities,
however, by those who wish to promote adherence to an international legal order
as an alternative to blatant exercise of economic power. It would be hard to fault
the former General Counsel of the IMF for being an effective spokesman for
adherence to an international legal regime with the IMF at its center. These
criticisms also overlook Sir Joseph's conviction, which underlies much of his
work, that economic conditions cannot be overlooked:
The moral [of the 1970s] is not that obligations and procedures under international law
should be rejected, but that they should be in harmony with economic conditions in the
world. What accords with economic conditions in one period might become impracticable when conditions change fundamentally. The international law relating to
exchange arrangements is not different in this respect from the international law that
governs other sectors of international relations. Treaties governing exchange arrangements should be formulated with sufficient flexibility to permit administration that takes
account of fundamental changes in economic conditions. 65
IV. Conclusion--Some Thoughts on the Future Development of
International Monetary Law
It may be that in international economic relations all that can be hoped for in the coming
years is "soft law" and more elaborate procedures for consultation, and that firm law
will be the work of generations.66
In recent years, there has been increasing interest among scholars in defining
and explaining the "soft law" nature of international law norms, 6 7 by which one
means the lack of strict application of rules and the weakness of enforcement
mechanisms. The International Monetary Fund is a perfect example of an
organization that practices "soft law," for several reasons:

The widespread neglect by members of much of the law following the breakdown
carried with it no intention on their part to accept the demise of law. Their conviction
of the value of international monetary law had become unassailable. The Fund and
national monetary authorities began almost at once to consider and then to negotiate
the reform of the international monetary system by means of a second amendment of
the Articles.
63. Mann, Book Review, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 192 (1979) (reviewing J. GOLD, LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECT ESSAYS (1984)).
64. Id.; F.A. MANN (1982 ed.), supra note 4, at 506 n.86; see also Hahn, Book Review, 34 AM.
J. Comp. L. 577, 582 (1986) (reviewing J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECT ESSAYS (1984)).
65. J. GOLD, supra note 15, at 19.
66. Gold, supra note 13, at 849.
67. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 25; Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983). The 1988 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law included a panel with the title "A Hard Look at Soft Law."
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(1) Since the adoption of the Second Amendment of the IMF Agreement,
exchange rates are subject to only loose rules of notice and the avoidance of
unduly disruptive practices.
(2) The financial operations of the Fund-from the duration of credit
operations to the conditionality of loans-have also become more varied and
flexible, in recognition of the intransigence of worldwide debt problems.
(3) There are considerable deviations, usually approved after the fact, from
the IMF code of conduct covering international payments. 68
(4) IMF rules are almost never subjected to the harsh glare of private
litigation, where hard choices must be made. 69
(5) Any debate over application of the rules is muted by the veil of decorum
and secrecy that surrounds the Fund, so that it is difficult to discover why certain
decisions were made, and whether they were made out of expediency or out of
a desire to adhere to a rule of law.
It is useless to decry the softness of IMF norms, for this characteristic will
remain part of the international monetary system for the foreseeable future. In
fact, it is not so clear that softness is "bad." Professor Michael Reisman has
pointed out that soft law has its beneficial effects,
provid[ing] negotiators and lawmakers with an alternative tool which supplies a
commonly accepted level of normative guidance yet allows adjustments through time
by unilateral initiation ....
Soft law is neither pathological nor systemically dysfunctional. It is appropriate and necessary, given the nature of the international political
system. 70
The existence of soft international law allows the IMF to react flexibly to
economic issues, while at the same time maintaining the existence of an
international monetary regime that could enforce harsh rules in reaction to
behavior that is perceived by consensus to be highly detrimental to the
international economy.
In addition to softness, another characteristic that will increasingly mark
international monetary law is complexity. The simple, clearly written rules that
gave rise to the "inflexibility" of the fixed exchange rate system have proven
unworkable in a world where economic power is widely dispersed among

68. See Zamora, supra note 42, at 120.
69. It is true that a number of municipal courts have been called on to apply art. VIII, sec. 2(b)
of the IMF Agreement. Despite the number of cases in which the provision has been discussed,
many questions still exist concerning its interpretation-questions that the Fund has not seen fit to
resolve through its powers of interpretation. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 18, at 477-90. The
provision has had very limited effect in the United States. See Zamora, Recognition of Foreign
Exchange Controls in International Creditors' Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 Irr'L LAW.
1055, 1063-69 (19870. Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics 10 (unpublished
paper presented at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Apr. 22,
1988, Washington, D.C.). See also J. GOLD, supra note 23, at 381 (extolling the "unusual
flexibility" of the Fund).
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different nations. In their place, we can expect a larger number of rules and
quasi-rules to shape IMF practice, rules that will be adopted in response to the
increasing complexity of international financial relations in general. 71 Simple
solutions, such as return
to a gold standard or to a simple, fixed exchange rate
72
system are unlikely.
A third characteristic to watch for in the future development of international
monetary law will be more creative uses of information technologies in creating
and enforcing rules. There has been little examination to date of the extent to
which computers and telecommunications networks can be used more aggressively by monetary authorities for regulatory purposes. As global banking
networks grow in size and sophistication, regulatory authorities will have to
create their own networks for information-sharing and for monitoring the
financial system. International organizations such as the IMF will enjoy an
enhanced ability to gather and process financial information, and this will allow
the IMF to adopt more detailed rules and to monitor their application.
If these predictions should prove correct, international monetary law in the
twenty-first century will be "soft," complex, and "high-tech"-the perfect
characteristics of a postmodern world in which rigid distinctions are blurred and
safe assumptions are tested. One such common distinction-the difference
between "law" and "nonlaw"-is becoming increasingly open to question.
This simple dichotomy leaves the impression that if a pronouncement is "law,"
it represents a strong constraint on behavior; if it is "nonlaw," no constraint
exists. It would be better to think of rules as ranging along a continuum.7 3 At one
extreme of the continuum, rules are precise and are followed without variation;
at the other end, rules may be vague, and deviations common. Most legal
regimes-including the existing regime of international monetary law-would
consist of rules at different points along the entire continuum, rather than at the
extremes. Rather than decrying the lack of international monetary law, or the
softness of the rules, international lawyers should concentrate on formulating
new rules and rule systems to add to the spectrum of law, rules that will help
reduce the disruptions that have beset the international financial system during
the past twenty years.

71. See K. DAM, supra note 25, at 342-43 ("rules can be expected to increase in detail and
complexity").
72. Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American
Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 504, 531 (1983) (a gold standard is "still economically as far
away as it was in the Roosevelt years," and a return to fixed exchange rates is also unlikely).
73. See Reisman, supra note 70, at 7:
The distinctions between degrees of control intention and severity of sanction are
extremely important for scholars and practitioners. But those distinctions range along
a continuum which is much more inflected than can be described by the diad "hard"
and "soft." Those terms are not only inadequate for description, but are also
insufficient for evaluation and action.
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